Aging in Japan by Hideo Ibe
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aging in Japan 
 
 
Hideo Ibe 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Completed 1997, Updated 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
International Longevity Center-USA, Ltd. 
60 East 86 th Street 
New York, NY 10028-1009 
(212) 288-1468   ¨   www.ilcusa.org 
 
 
Copyright © 2000 by ILC-USA    WP-2000-02 
 
Preface 
 Dr. Hideo Ibe, one of Japan’s finest public servants, has made significant contributions 
to the creation of Japan’s health, welfare and pension systems.  In this paper, Dr. Ibe 
addresses some of the problems confronting Japan today, among them pensions, long-term 
care, housing policies and the legal system.  Of surprise to a reader from the West who may 
assume that Asia is still under the influence of Confucian rules of filial duty is Dr. Ibe’s 
contention that “there is almost no continuity of values between the old and young.”  He is 
particularly concerned about the decline in births, and what he regards as the loss of “self 
confidence” on the part of Japanese men. 
2. 
 
The International Longevity Center-USA has great admiration for Dr. Ibe, who helped 
forge the partnership between the ILC-Japan and the ILC-USA.  He also inspired “A 
Comparative Study of Value and Value Transmission,” which was conducted by the two 
ILCs.  This study was reported in detail at the annual meeting of the Gerontological Society of 
America in 1995.i 
 
Dr. Ibe fears that if the low birthrate continues at its present pace, in one hundred 
years the population of Japan will be less than half of what it is today.  However, during this 
new century, much can change.  Factors that affect fertility – from the unusually complex and 
problematic social relationships that exist between men and women in Japan today, to the 
high costs of schooling – may be ameliorated.  But, until attitude transformations and 
effective politics are introduced, Dr. Ibe, astute and activist policymaker, is not likely to be 
assured. 
 
 
      Robert N. Butler, M.D. 
      President and CEO 
      The International Longevity Center-USA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i A Comparative Study of Values and Value Transmission between Japan and the United States, Part II, U.S. 
Report, by Charlotte Muller, Ph.D. and Catherine B. Silver, International Longevity Center (Japan), Tokyo, 
Japan, 127-197, March 1995. 
 
Effects of Ascribed and Achieved Characteristics on Social Values in Japan and the United States, Research in 
Stratification and Mobility, by Catherine B. Silver and Charlotte Muller, Ph.D., Vol. 15, 153-176, 1997. 
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Introduction 
 
 What distinguishes the aging of Japanese society from that of other industrialized 
societies is its rapid pace.  In 1995, elderly persons made up only 14.6% of the population.  
Current projections are that this proportion will nearly double to 27.4% in the year 2025.  The 
proportion of working age people to Japan's entire population is also sharply declining.  By 
2050 it is expected that one in every three persons will be 65 years old or over.  This will be 
not so much due to an increase in the average lifespan as to the decreasing birthrate;  that is, 
we are having fewer children. 
 
 Until now, the elderly have lived relatively comfortable lives partly because of the 
financial stability made possible by pensions and partly because of the availability of low-cost 
medical care under the universal insurance system.  Below the surface, however, lie some 
concerns, such as long-term care, medical insurance finance and pension finance.  The Gold 
Plan and the long-term care insurance bill are intended to address long-term care issues, and 
the Angel Plan is designed to improve the low birthrate issue.  In addition, as the proportion 
of the elderly grows, old-age pension payments will decrease and the pensionable age will be 
raised. 
 
 Moreover, the government's inadequate housing and land policies as well as our 
system of laws are the source of dilemmas the Japanese people, as a whole must face.  The 
widows and spouses of eldest sons are often the victims of outrageous inheritance tax rates, 
forced out of proportion by wildly inflated land prices.  Laws designed to protect their human 
rights and human dignity, including adult guardian law, should be passed.  Another knotty 
problem is how the values of the older generations can be transmitted to the young.  This is a 
particularly crucial issue in Japan where there is almost no continuity of values between the 
old and the young. 
 
 In order to prevent a further decline of the birthrate, an important factor behind the 
rapidly aging population, government financial support is indispensable.  Tax burdens bear 
down hard on working people in their 30s, discouraging them from marrying and having 
babies.  But what seems a more fundamental problem, in my view, is the loss of self-
confidence and drive among Japanese men since the end of World War II.  They are 
apparently lacking in appeal as marriage partners from the viewpoint of women.  It is 
important that younger Japanese men recover confidence and reestablish their self-esteem. 
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1. Features of Japan's Aging Society 
 
A major feature of the aging of Japanese society is its rapid pace.  As shown in Table 
1, Japan is the only nation in the world where the proportion of the elderly to the population in 
1995 (14.6%) is projected to nearly double by the year 2025 (27.4%).  The rate of aging is 
measured by the percentage of elderly persons in the total population.  In other words, an 
acceleration of this rate results not just from an increase in the number of older citizens but 
also from a decline in numbers among the younger generations. 
 
 For Japan, the central cause of the rapid rate of aging is not only the higher life 
expectancy among the elderly and the resultant increase in their number, but also the steady 
decline in numbers among the younger generations.  The National Institute of Population and 
Social Security Research announced its projections in January 1997.  Future population 
estimates for Japan are shown in Table 2. 
 
 Regardless of which forecast is applied, a significant decrease in the working age 
population and an increase in the number of elderly persons is unavoidable.  In fact, by the 
end of 1997 the population over 65 years of age in Japan exceeded the population of those 
under fifteen.  Assuming the low birthrate continues at its present pace, the population of 
Japan (which now totals 126 million) will fall to less than 100 million by the year 2051 and to 
60 million by the year 2100. 
 
 The resultant shrinking market, dwindling labor force, and reduced insurance premium 
and taxpaying capability will bring about an economic decline, and it is feared that the 
sources of revenue required to maintain the present social overhead capital will dry up.  In 
particular, it will no longer be possible to maintain the quite generous, current welfare 
measures for senior citizens. 
 
 In an attempt to curb the growing tendency of families to have fewer children, the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare prepared the Angel Plan in 1994.  This plan is intended to 
identify the causes of the declining birthrate, which is the most significant factor in the 
tendency to have fewer children, and to formulate countermeasures.  The plan focuses on the 
measures to support child rearing.  A broad range of measures have been incorporated into the 
plan, including the development of an improved environment (such as the improvements in 
the nursery care system to support working mothers), the development of housing, 
revitalization of local communities, improvements in school education and measures to 
alleviate the cost of child rearing.  However, an honest assessment of the impact of these 
measures would reveal that they have not been particularly effective. 
 
 One of the reasons why this is the case is that though the Angel Plan was developed 
with an emphasis on the creation of an environment which would facilitate child rearing, there 
is some doubt as to whether the poor child-raising environment is the only reason why 
Japanese families choose to have an extremely small number of children. 
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 Considering the causes of the low birthrate, I would first point out that as the number 
of births outside of marital relationships in Japan is extremely low, the decline is related to the 
increasing percentage of people who remain single.  As shown in Table 3, the percentage of 
never married men between the ages of 30 and 39 rose by 10.5% during 1980-95, although 
the total percentage of never married men increased only 3.3% during that period.  As a result, 
the number of births in the last fifteen years decreased by 394,762 (Table 4). 
 
Although sufficient analysis has not yet been done to pinpoint the causes of the sudden 
rise in the ratio of never married people since 1980, it is my conjecture that changes in the 
economic environment are a major factor.  As will be discussed below, people in their thirties 
are the most economically disadvantaged age bracket in Japan, and it is believed that this 
discourages them not only from having children but even from getting married.  This 
assumption seems to be corroborated by the findings of the Health and Welfare Ministry's 
Institute of Population Problems survey in which the most frequently cited response to the 
question "Why didn't you have the number of children you wanted?" was "Because raising 
children costs money." 
 
 Other than the economic reason mentioned above, changes in women's awareness due 
to the higher level of education and increasing social independence have also been pointed out 
as another reason for the decreasing birthrate.  With the spread of democracy in Japan after 
World War II, Japanese women, who have developed a degree of independence comparable to 
their counterparts in Europe and the United States, have begun to think that it is natural for 
them to find their own destiny in life.  In other words, they are now able to make important 
life decisions by themselves, such as whether to marry, whether to have a child, or when to 
have a child. 
 
 The distinguishing feature of aging in Japan, then, is the combination of the increase 
in life expectancy, a positive factor, and the decrease in the number of children, a negative 
factor.  For the most part, government policies and our own awareness have not kept pace 
with the rapid advance of this phenomenon, which is occurring more rapidly in Japan than 
any other nation in the world.  For the present, there are too many concerns surrounding the 
issue of old-age security to allow us to really celebrate the advent of prolonged longevity. 
 
 
2. The Current Situation of the Elderly in Japan 
 
Although many are anxious about their future, the majority of older citizens at least today 
enjoy very favorable conditions.  The main reason is the expansion/improvement of the 
medical care system and the financial stability primarily provided by the pension program.  
By 1995, the average life expectancy at birth for men had risen to 76.38 years while that for 
woman had reached 82.85 years, and life expectancy in Japan has been the highest in the 
world since the middle of the 1990s.  The average income per elderly household member over 
70 is $1.86 million yen ($15,500), exceeding the average of 1.77 million yen ($14,750) for 
persons in their thirties, according to the Public Opinion Survey on Household Saving of The 
Central Council for Savings Information (1996).  (The foreign exchange rate used throughout 
this article is Y120 = $1.00.) 
6. 
Based on the same survey, the elderly receive 54.8% of their income from public pensions (a 
system in Japan which is roughly equivalent to a Social Security pension in the US, and the 
average accumulated savings of people over 70 is 18.87 million yen ($157,000.00).  For 
details on the Japanese pension system, see the section "2-3. Pension." 
 
 Moreover, combined medical benefits, pensions, and social services provided for the 
elderly totaled 37,305.8 billion yen ($310 billion) in FY 1994, which represented 61.7% of all 
national benefits for a variety of social security programs. 
 
 These figures inspire an image of elderly citizens enjoying liberal provisions for social 
security, but what lies behind this?  I would like to examine the current social security 
provisions for the elderly in Japan and their inherent problems. 
 
 
2-1. Long-term Care 
 
 A public opinion survey of the elderly reveals that Japanese older citizens are anxious 
about their future lifestyle, and particularly about long-term care (Table 7).  In fact, the 
number of elderly people in need of care who are bedridden or suffer from senile dementia is 
increasing.  As shown in Table 8, the percentage of people who require care increases with 
age.  While only around 1.5% of those between the ages of 65 to 69 require care, this rate 
rises with each age group, reaching 11.5% for ages 80 to 84 and 24% or one in every four 
people among those over 85.  The same survey estimates that for almost an equal percentage, 
physical infirmity makes the unaided performance of activity of daily living very difficult and 
time consuming, necessitating some form of long-term care. 
 
 In response to the concerns of citizens, the Japanese government drew up the Ten-
Year Strategy to Promote Health Care and Welfare for the Elderly (Gold Plan) in 1989.  This 
plan, adopted as part of the reason for the introduction of the consumption tax in April 1989, 
proposed goals in health and welfare services for the elderly to be realized, concluding at the 
end of the ten-year plan in FY 1999.  The plan designated seven main projects, including the 
urgent adoption of more effective in-home welfare policies in every municipality, the 
promotion of the "New Campaign to Reduce the Number of Bedridden Elderly People to 
Zero,” and the urgent establishment of related facilities.  The budget for the Gold Plan 
exceeded 6 trillion yen ($50 billion) for the entire ten-year period, the first long-term plan of 
this scale in the field of health and welfare. 
 
 In December 1994, five years into the plan, the New Gold Plan was formulated to 
incorporate revisions to the first plan and increase its effectiveness.  Goals for establishing 
urgently needed infrastructure for care services for the elderly were identified and a basic 
framework for additional policies, which must be pursued in the near future, were presented.  
Moreover, a long-term care insurance bill was submitted to the National Diet with the aim of 
providing more efficient long-term care services starting with the year 2000. 
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2-2. Medical Care (See Tables 9 and 10) 
 
 Once, unlike the health insurance system for company employees, the national health 
insurance system for self-employed persons covered only half of those who fell in this 
category and the content of the insurance was very poor.  As part of the Five-Year Plan for 
Economic Independence, which set 1960 as the final target year, a four-year plan for realizing 
national health insurance covering all Japanese citizens was launched, and with the passing of 
the New National Health Insurance Bill in 1958 and the subsequent period of high economic 
growth, popular concern over medical costs disappeared.  It would be no exaggeration to say 
that the long-term monopoly of the Liberal Democratic Party over political power resulted 
from the introduction of this bill.  Even today, excluding certain costs such as hospital room 
charges, Japan offers almost every citizen the best possible medical care regardless of their 
income. 
 
 Considering the deeply rooted problems the United States currently faces with its 
medical insurance system, of all the projects I have been involved with, the passing of this 
health insurance bill is one of the policies, which I am most proud of.  There is, however, 
some truth to the criticism that this generous system has led to declining awareness of the 
actual costs of medical care in Japan. 
 
 Along with the soaring health expenditure for the elderly, the entire medical insurance 
system is approaching a major turning point.  The pensions allotted to the elderly would have 
served as an overall living allowance including medical care, and there would have been no 
need to single out the elderly alone for preferential resource allocation for their medical 
treatment. 
 
 Around 1970, however, when the pension system had not yet fully matured and rapid 
economic growth meant that there was plenty of tax revenue available, the reformist governor 
of Tokyo decided to provide free medical care to the elderly.  This became a symbol of 
welfare services for the elderly, and similar policies spread throughout the country.  Later, 
pension reforms resulted in greatly improved benefits, setting a target for the benefit as high 
as 60% of the standard remuneration.  At that point, the system of free medical care for the 
elderly in order to lessen the economic burden on the elderly ceased to be justified. 
 
 If financial inequalities among individual pension recipients were a problem, then they 
should have been encouraged to create their own health insurance through the establishment 
of mutual aid associations.  Instead, free medical care for the elderly invited skyrocketing 
health care costs with particularly drastic effects on the national health insurance system.  
Although health insurance societies have contributed one trillion yen ($8.3 billion) to finance 
the national health insurance system, the situation has not improved.  It would seem to make 
more sense for pension recipients to pay for their own health insurance from their pension 
income in order to receive medical benefits. 
 
  
8. 
Reform of the present medical insurance system is being debated, and we must at least 
review the system whereby those over 70, regardless of their earning power, are exempt from 
insurance premiums while at the same time enjoying significantly reduced co-payments for 
medical treatment. 
 
 
2-3. Pension (See Tables 11 and 12) 
 
 In Japan, the pension system covers nearly the entire population of the country, just 
like medical insurance.  However, the system itself is very complex.  It is divided into five 
schemes depending on whom you work for, and contains gaps in benefit amounts among the 
different schemes (Table 12).  Thus, the integration of the system remains a significant 
challenge for the future.  In addition, pension benefits rose markedly after the pension system 
was reformed in 1973, and since then several additional revisions have been made.  Now, 
however, a reduction in current pension benefits is being debated due to a serious concern 
over future financing of the pension system. 
 
 Compared to the American average of $600 per month, the Japanese pension of 
220,000 yen ($1,880) (employees’ pension) is very high.  This blunder was made during the 
1973 reform, which set the pension level at 60% of the individual’s wage excluding bonuses.  
The 45% recommended in Convention No. 127 of the International Labor Organization would 
have been more appropriate. 
 
 Closely related to the previously mentioned decreasing number of children are 
projections that the percentage of elderly persons in the total population will exceed 30% by 
2050 and the old dependency ratio (the ratio of 65 years and over to the working age 
population) will jump from 21% in 1995 to 59%.  Revision of pension benefits and payments 
is therefore inevitable.  In the amendment to the law adopted in 1996, the age at which the 
elderly begin receiving pension benefits has already been raised from 60 to 65, and a further 
hike is being considered.  How to deal with the approximately 2 million people who are not 
paying into any pension plan is also a major problem. 
 
 In addition to these issues, the fundamental philosophy underlying pensions is being 
questioned.  Pension financing methods are the “funding method,” in which money invested 
will be returned in the future, and the “pay-as-you-go method,” which is an intergenerational 
assistance system. However, as long as we leave things as they are without obtaining the full 
consensus of the nation concerning the present pension system, we risk confrontation between 
the younger and older generations and a crisis in the very philosophy of social security. 
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2.4 Other Issues 
 
 In addition to the above, several other problems are outlined below. 
 
 
Housing Policy 
 
 Housing is said to be fundamental to welfare and, as such, Western countries have 
identified housing as one focus of social policy, highlighting it as a major challenge for the 
entire nation.  Viewed from a different angle, because Japan failed to see housing as a 
national minimum condition for social security, land became the object of speculation, 
inviting astronomical land prices and uncontrolled development.  Surely it is time for Japan to 
commit itself to making housing and land policy a national priority. 
 
 Likewise, it is necessary to establish the concept of “aging in place,” which allows the 
elderly to live out their lives in their own homes.  It goes without saying that inferior housing 
conditions and exorbitant land and housing prices, moreover, are a major impediment to 
bearing and raising children. 
 
 
Inadequate Legal System 
 
(1) The majority of organizations employing a mandatory retirement age system still 
designate 60 as the age of retirement.  However, in consideration of the decline in the number 
of people of working age and the raising of the pensionable age, we need to provide 
opportunities for those who wish to work at least up until the age of 70.  Unfortunately, unlike 
in the United States, there is no law prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of 
age, nor is there even any sign that public opinion might call for such a change. 
 
(2) We should be careful in interpreting the information, which indicates that the elderly 
living in Japan and in urban areas in particular own substantial assets.  The problem is that 
most of their assets are in the form of real estate, which is sometimes called “paper wealth.”  
While the value of land as an asset has been soaring because of land price increases, various 
problems arise at the time of inheritance.  The estate tax for appreciated land properties has 
become enormous, and thus almost no one can pay the estate tax in cash.  In the end, many 
people cannot help but pay taxes by selling the estate itself. 
 
Moreover, there are many cases in which bereaved wives cannot continue living at 
home after their husbands have died, because under Japanese law, wives have the right to 
inherit one-half of the estate.  The remainder is equally divided among the bereaved children.  
Though the importance of the philosophy of “aging in place” is emphasized as described 
above, the contradiction between the philosophy and reality must be addressed. 
 
I have been proposing that we revise our legal system so that bereaved wives can 
inherit the entire estate of their husbands and that children can inherit the estate only after the 
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bereaved wives have died.  I have a renewed feeling about my proposal whenever I hear 
recent stories of family tragedies involving the inheritance of land. 
 
Nor can we overlook the problem of “the eldest son’s wife.”  No matter how much she 
might sacrifice in order to care for her husband’s parents, legally she has no right to any 
inheritance from them.  How can this discrepancy be resolved?  Reluctance to be saddled with 
caring for a husband’s parents in their old age has been cited as one of the main reasons 
women avoid marriage.  If the birthrate continues to decline, it will become quite common for 
one couple to be responsible for the care of as many as four parents.  If in-home care 
continues to be the government’s basic approach, then the government should make laws 
more in accordance with realities, instead of relying on noble-sounding but vague rhetoric 
about filial affection. 
 
(3) I would also like to touch upon “adult guardian law” or systems for providing legal 
guardianship for the elderly.  Such systems, which have already been implemented in Germany 
and other countries in order to protect the human rights of the elderly and guard their right to 
make their own decisions, establish a legal guardian who is responsible for accurately 
conveying the will of an elderly person and is given the right to act as their representative.  
Steps are currently being taken to formulate similar legislation in Japan, including exploration 
of test cases by local government employees. 
 
 
Value and Value Transmission 
 
 A Comparative Study of Value and Value Transmission between Japan and the US 
conducted by the International Longevity Center in 1993 (see footnote 1) clearly revealed a 
difference in the role played by parents in the transmission of values.  As detailed results were 
presented at the 1995 conference of the Gerontological Society of America, I will simply 
mention some of the major features, omitting the details. 
 
 Whereas parents in the United States clearly strive to verbally transmit their values to 
their children, Japanese parents not only do not exhibit any effort to do so, but do not display 
confidence that their values are transmitted to their children.  I have repeatedly pointed out 
that this is due to the loss of pride the Japanese people suffered in their defeat at the end of 
World War II and the wholesale discarding of the values of the past that occurred in the 
postwar period. 
 
 According to a Management and Coordination Agency survey of world youth, under 
the category of supporting one’s parents in their old age, Japan ranked tenth out of eleven 
countries, with only 25% responding that they would do anything to care for their parents.  
Japan came nowhere near South Korea at 70% and did not even reach half the figure of 52% 
for the United States.  Considering that it was Sweden, with its well-established social welfare 
system that ranked eleventh, Japan’s poor rating is all the more striking. 
 
 We can only feel uneasy about what kind of changes will take place in the Japanese 
awareness of intergenerational mutual assistance when the sharply dropping birthrate ushers 
in the “super-aged” society. 
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In Conclusion:  Suggestions for Raising the Birthrate 
 
 As I have described above, the gravest problem arising from the aging of society in 
Japan is the declining number of children.  I have already discussed the resultant problems 
and possible avenues towards solution under each topic, but in addition to these, the expanded 
employment of women, the elderly and workers from overseas can help to solve the problems 
of a dwindling workforce. 
 
 What type of policies can be employed to stop the continuing decline in the birthrate, 
the major cause of the problem of people with fewer children? 
 
 First, although many oppose interference by the state in such a private affair as 
childbirth, any nation aware of a situation that could result in its collapse that does not attempt 
to devise some countermeasure will be subject to the charge of irresponsibility to future 
generations.  Of course, on the micro level, having children is indeed a private and individual 
affair, but I believe we are at the point where we must acknowledge that on a macro level this 
issue affects the entire nation. 
 
 I would like to present a rather drastic proposal in this regard.  I recommended that a 
deduction of 5 million yen ($42,000) for the birth of one’s first child and a further 2 million 
yen ($16,000) deduction for every child thereafter be added to the present income tax 
deduction, and that child care and education expenses also be made deductible.  Children 
should be regarded as public assets, and this intent must be clearly reflected in the national tax 
system subsidizing childbirth and child rearing. 
 
 Working people in their thirties are the most financially hard-pressed in Japan today, a 
situation which greatly inhibits marriage and childbirth, as I have repeatedly pointed out.  
Soaring land prices and the rising cost of educating children over the last 15 years, for 
example, defy the imagination.  Yet the tax exemption for dependents remains fixed at 
380,000 yen ($3,100) per person.  In other words, the government has provided no incentives 
whatsoever in its tax system to accommodate the rising costs of supporting a family and 
educating children, depending entirely upon the goodwill and efforts of individuals.  The 
government should present drastic measures based on the reflection on this situation. 
 
 As more women work, we must consider how to provide better child-care services.  
Adequate child-care facilities must, of course, be established, but as an additional measure, 
socializing child care should be promoted:  that is, women at home, for example, could be 
organized to provide baby-sitting services, with fees for this service made tax-deductible.  
Such institutional improvements, I believe, can exert a positive impact on the birthrate. 
 
 On the other hand, little study has been made of, and few solutions pursued from, the 
psychological aspects of the issue.  Here I present some of my own observations on this 
subject. 
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 During the pre-World War II period, the system of arranged marriages functioned very 
effectively, successfully joining together eligible men and women in matrimony.  Now, 
however, when postwar democracy, with its concept of equality of the sexes, has become 
firmly established, a strong counter reaction has emerged to the prewar male-centered 
arranged marriage system in which family balance was given priority.  Now, the majority of 
marriages are based on love and the freedom to choose one’s own partner.  The fact that 
women have equal rights in terms of choosing a spouse means that instead of being the 
selectors, men also are the ones who are selected.  It is a common saying in Japan that 
“women and stockings grew stronger after the war,” but in fact it is simply that men have 
grown weaker. 
 
For several months after the defeat, Japanese males remained completely devastated.  
Women, forced to carry on with the daily tasks of life, could not indulge such feelings; they 
gallantly rose up to support their families, their communities, and their nation. 
 
In time, of course, men resolutely plunged into work in order to survive, and before 
they realized it, they had transformed Japan into the world’s second largest economic power.  
This period deserves special mention in the annals of Japanese history.  Through the 
propaganda of the Occupation authorities and anti-Japanese media coverage, however, 
Japanese males lost confidence in their nation and its traditions and became too ashamed and 
neglectful to pass on their moral values to their children, especially their sons.  The way 
history was taught, the abolition of classes on history education and morality in the schools, 
and the influence of the Japan Teachers Union were also contributing factors.  I touched upon 
this when I discussed the passing over of values between the generations. 
 
The defeat shamed those who lived during the war and left them burdened by 
tremendous guilt at remaining alive, a guilt they relieved by dedicating their efforts to their 
dead comrades.  What they did was not wrong, but it is a great tragedy that their energy was 
solely directed towards Japan’s economic recovery rather than towards the restoration of their 
self-respect through the preservation of their dignity and faith as human beings and as 
Japanese. 
 
At the same time, Japanese males, who saw themselves as relieved of the 
responsibility for protecting their nation, women and children under the second clause of 
Article 9 of the Constitution, grew progressively emasculated, becoming the object of 
women’s contempt.  Men are urged to study hard, scolded by their mothers at home and by 
female teachers at school, and bullied by girl classmates.  Discrimination based on the 
perceived academic ranking of the school is a contributing problem.  Girls will have nothing 
to do with boys who attend schools that are perceived to rank academically lower than their 
own.  Even if they attend the same school, girls evince no interest in boys with lower grades.  
This principle of ranking becomes even more pronounced at the university level. 
 
I was told by the Maritime Self-Defense Force that because women are more highly 
motivated than men, the Force plans to increase their number to 10% of the 35,000 member 
force.  Likewise, it is women athletes who are winning at international sports meets.  If this 
trend continues, women may control not only sports but politics, diplomacy and even defense. 
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The rising percentage of never married people in industrialized nations is often viewed 
as a women’s issue attributed to the increase in the number of working women and higher 
education.  The conspicuous feature of this phenomenon in Japan, however, is the 
accompanying enfeeblement of men.  Whether because men do not have the courage to 
approach women or because they cannot win female attention to begin with, the responsibility 
would seem to lie with men. 
 
We would like women to realize that a man’s value lies not just in his academic 
credentials or what university he graduated from, but in his “aspirations” and his “sound 
mind” and “body”; to recognize that the supportive companionship of a woman can imbue a 
man with courage and vitality; and to appreciate the splendor of building a wonderful family 
based on mutual respect.  If not, the Japanese population will continue to steadily decline until 
it is reduced by one third.  That could parallel the fate of the population of medieval Europe 
after the scourges of the plague. 
 
A bright future for Japan depends upon men regaining their confidence and self-
esteem and becoming thereby more attractive to women. 
14. 
Afterword 
 
‘Aging in Japan’ was completed in 1997.  Considering the prominent changes Japan 
has experienced over aging issues since then, the following points should be added. 
 
1) It seems there is no end to the unprecedented speed of population aging and low 
birthrate in Japan.  Specific data is shown as follows: 
 
Ratio of Elderly Population (aged 65 and over) 
 
 1995  14.6% 
 1998  16.2% 
 1999  16.7% 
 2000  17.1% 
 
 Total Fertility Rate 
 
 1995  1.42 
 1998  1.38 
 1999  1.34 
 
2) The Public Long-term Care Insurance System formally started nationwide in April 
2000, ten years after the introduction of the Gold Plan.  It intends to support in-
home care of the entire society based on the establishment of various 
infrastructures for care services.  The system has adopted an insurance system, and 
aims to provide care services rather than cash allowances. 
 
3) In April 2000, the “Adult Guardian Law” was implemented as well, which shows 
great progress from the standpoint of protecting the property and lives of the 
elderly, defending their human rights and respecting their self-determination. 
 
15. 
 
Commentary 
 
 How much should Dr. Hideo Ibe worry about Japan’s declining birthrate? 
 
 In the past 40 years, Japan’s birthrate has declined steadily and fertility rates have 
fallen below replacement levels.  After World War II, Japanese society began to change 
dramatically, as Japanese women gained greater independence and the numbers of unmarried 
men and women of childbearing age increased significantly. 
 
 Like most nations of the world, Japan is experiencing a new kind of population 
growth.  Since the early 1900s the average life expectancy in the industrialized world has 
increased by nearly 30 years.  At the same time, the total fertility rate has decreased.  For 
example, the European community is 34% below the replacement rate of 2.1. children per 
couple.  With the exception of Ireland and Turkey, each year there are fewer Europeans than 
the year before. 
 
 In response to the dramatic population shift, in 1994 the Japanese Ministry of Health 
and Welfare prepared what became known as the Angel Plan.  This Plan identified the causes 
of the lower birth rate and attempted to formulate countermeasures in support of marriage and 
child rearing. 
 
 Among his own policy initiatives, Ibe suggested that the government provide a major 
tax deduction for each child, who would be regarded as a “public asset.” 
 
 Dr. Ibe is not alone in his concern over this demographic change.  The American 
writer, Ben Wattenberg,1 has expressed his concern over the “birth dearth” in the United 
States and what he calls the “Graying of Europe.”  However, demographers are also 
concerned about the “population explosion” 2 (which is projected to reach 11 billion by 2050), 
the unevenness of family planning around the world and the precarious relationship between 
population and resources. 
 
 Yet, low fertility may not be the problem.  It may be one solution to a variety of 
population issues. 
 
· Many economists claim that in the interest of economic growth, populations – 
representing workers and consumers – must expand.  However, modern methods of 
productivity in both agriculture and manufacture require fewer workers than in the 
past.  For example, at the turn of the last century, 37% of Americans were farmers; 
that number has shrunk to 2%.  Yet more food is produced each year.  Similarly, fewer 
people are required in steel and automobile plants.  Even the services industries are 
increasingly mechanized and automated. 
 
                                        
1 Wattenberg, B., The Birth Dearth. World Almanac, 1987. 
2 Teitelbaum, M.S., and Winter, J., A Question of Numbers: High Migration, Low Fertility and the Politics of 
National Identity, Hill and Wang, 1998. 
16. 
· The critical variable is the purchasing power of existing consumers, not their absolute 
numbers.  While it is true that slower population growth means fewer consumers, it is 
also true that purchasing power is higher for educated, employed workers than for the 
uneducated and unemployed.  If the population decreased, societies could meet the 
needs of more people because the absolute wealth of the nation would be divided 
among fewer people.  Poverty and hunger would decrease and the surplus could be 
used to make technological advances to further enhance quality of life.  For example, 
the material resources of small families are not spread as thin as those of a large 
family.  Generally, unless they are wealthy, parents with few children do a better job 
of rearing their children and providing them with a good education. 
 
· Smaller populations result in less crowding, pollution, unemployment and urban 
sprawl. 
 
Another concern is that too few workers will be available to support the growing numbers 
of older persons, and that labor shortages will result. 
 
 Productive aging is a particularly important adjustment that society must make to a 
lower birthrate.  Since more people are living longer and healthier lives, it makes sense that 
they should work longer.  Some economists have compared the number of persons age 65 and 
older with those 18 to 64 – the so-called “dependency ratio” – and their conclusions have 
been pessimistic.  However, when the economists factor in the first 17 years of life, then 
declining birth rates offset the growing proportion of older persons.  Thus, as the birth rate 
declines the ratio of older persons and children to workers will actually decline or remain 
essentially the same. 
 
 Dr. Hideo Ibe, and others who share his views, represent an important sector of social, 
cultural and economic thought.  Both sides of the debate must be heard, and the dialogue may 
result in wiser social policies. 
 
 For example, the nations of the world might decide to put a premium on the education 
of the young, the productive use of older persons, the encouragement of providential savings, 
the growth of the mature market or “silver industries,” support of science and technology, the 
promotion of healthier, positive intergenerational relationships and the reduction of ageism. 
 
 The phenomenon of longevity will become even more pronounced in the 21st century 
and all countries will experience some change in their age structure.  Societies will be called 
upon to rethink health care, education, the work place and relationships between the 
generations. 
 
 Perhaps nations will eventually find it advantageous to encourage an initial decrease in 
the birth rate followed by stabilization of the population. 
 
 Policy-makers must always respond to specific national issues of politics, culture, race 
and ethnicity.  Yet ultimately, they all will face the increasing longevity of their populations 
and the need to pursue positive and productive attitudes and policies. 
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